What is a sign?
A good place to start is the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). His lectures, published by his students after his death as the Course in General Linguistics (1916), shaped how linguists think about words.
Saussure described a word as a sign with two sides:
- The signifier: the form, such as the sound pattern of the word apple.
- The signified: the idea it calls up, the concept of the fruit.
His key point was that the link between the two is arbitrary. Nothing about the fruit calls for the sounds of apple. German says Apfel, Spanish manzana, French pomme, Hungarian alma and Japanese ringo. Each word works because its speakers share the same convention.
Even words that imitate sounds are less natural than they seem. An English dog says woof, a Spanish one guau and a Japanese one wan wan. Saussure treated such words as a small exception, and even they follow the sound habits of each language.
For learners, this has a plain consequence: you usually cannot guess what a word means from its sound. Each one is a convention you pick up by meeting it in use. The exception is a related language, where many words share a history, as part 4 of this series shows.
Three kinds of signs
Around the same time, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) sorted signs by how they connect to what they stand for. Three of his types have become classics:
- Icon (resemblance): the sign looks or sounds like what it means. The figures on toilet doors are icons, and so is a drawing of a fire.
- Index (connection): the sign is linked to its meaning by cause or contact. Smoke is an index of fire, and a footprint in the mud is an index of the animal that passed.
- Symbol (convention): the sign means something only because people have agreed on it. A red octagon means "stop", and the word water means water.
These are kinds of signs, not steps on a ladder. People use all three every day, and one sign can mix them: a road sign with a leaping deer shows a picture (an icon) inside a shape that drivers learn to read as a warning (a symbol). Most words, though, are symbols in Peirce's sense, which is Saussure's point about arbitrariness seen from another side.
Animals send signals too
Animal communication can be remarkably precise.
When a honeybee finds a good patch of flowers, she returns to the hive and performs a waggle dance on the vertical comb. The Austrian biologist Karl von Frisch, who decoded it, showed that the angle of the dance gives the direction of the food relative to the sun, and the length of the waggle gives a rough idea of the distance. Other bees use this to find flowers they have never seen.
Vervet monkeys in East Africa give different alarm calls for different predators. In a well-known study, Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney and Peter Marler (1980) played recorded calls from a hidden loudspeaker, with no predator around. The monkeys reacted as if they knew what each call meant:
- a leopard alarm sent them running up into trees,
- an eagle alarm made them look up, and often run into bushes,
- a snake alarm made them stand up and look at the ground.
Nothing about the eagle call sounds like an eagle. In that sense it already works a little like a word. So the difference between animal and human communication is not that animals have no meaningful signals.
Displacement: talking about what is not here
In 1960, the American linguist Charles Hockett listed a set of "design features" that together describe human language. One of them he called displacement: the ability to talk about things that are far away in space or time.
Hockett's own example of displacement in an animal was the bee dance. The food is out of sight, and the dancer reports on a trip she has already made. So animals are not simply "trapped in the present".
The difference is how freely humans use it. Bees dance about food, and about a new home when their swarm is looking for one. Vervet alarm calls are about a predator nearby. Human speakers can talk about anything that is not in front of them:
- the past: "I saw a leopard by the river yesterday."
- the future: "It might come back tomorrow."
- other places: "There are no leopards where my sister lives."
- things that do not exist at all: "Imagine a leopard with wings."
Displacement is a feature of the language itself: words that stand for things by convention, and ways to combine them, let a speaker point anywhere and to any time.
Talking about things that do not exist
The last item on that list may matter most. In his bestseller Sapiens, the historian Yuval Noah Harari argues that the ability to talk about things that exist only in our shared imagination is what allowed humans to cooperate in very large groups.
His argument goes like this. Chimpanzees cooperate with individuals they know well, which keeps their groups small. Humans can work with thousands or millions of strangers because they believe in the same stories: gods and nations, laws and human rights, companies and money. A banknote is a piece of paper, but it buys bread because everyone agrees on what it stands for. In Peirce's terms, money is a symbol.
This is Harari's thesis, and historians and anthropologists debate parts of it, including when and how such a change took place. But it shows how far displacement reaches: from a warning about a leopard by the river to the shared ideas that hold whole societies together.
What's next
Symbols and displacement describe what human language can do. They do not explain how humans came to have it. In part 2, we look at the body and the brain: the larynx, the gene the press once called the "language gene", why a learned society in Paris banned the whole topic in 1866, and what the first words might have been like.